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Conference papers

Lawyers’ Reputation and the Quality of Legal Services: An Economic Analysis of Self-Regulation

Camille Chaserant 1 Sophie Harnay
1 EconomiX
Abstract : Forthcoming
Document type :
Conference papers
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https://hal-univ-paris10.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01411771
Contributor : Administrateur Hal Nanterre <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, December 7, 2016 - 4:34:48 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, November 19, 2019 - 9:30:35 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-01411771, version 1

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CNRS | UNIV-PARIS10 | ECONOMIX | UNIV-PARIS-LUMIERES

Citation

Camille Chaserant, Sophie Harnay. Lawyers’ Reputation and the Quality of Legal Services: An Economic Analysis of Self-Regulation. ISNIE (International Society for New Institutional Economics, 2013, Florence, Italy. ⟨hal-01411771⟩

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